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Beyond the traditional debates over information exchange vs  flat taxation at source, 
legislative advances have produced interesting innovations and suggestions concerning how 
to tax international savings. We examine some of these advances, which we then use to set 
forth and investigate a proposal for European and international savings taxation. That 
proposition combines the outcome of a recent Dutch reform and lessons from the US qualified 
intermediaries mechanism. We show that such a system exhibits the same desirable properties 
as exchange of information, but potentially at reduced compliance cost, and is sustainable 
within a repeated game framework.  
JEL Code: H31, H73, H87. 





Catholic University of Mons 







This paper elaborates on ideas that I first discussed at the CESifo Munich-Delphi Conference 
in November 2003 in Munich, and on the occasion of a seminar in Konstanz, in December 
2003. Lecturing at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques of Lyon 2 University helped me to 
formulate them better. A draft of this paper was presented to the CESifo Area Conference on 
Public Sector Economics in May 2004 where it benefited from a detailed discussion by Ruud 
de Mooij. I am especially grateful to him as well as to Joann Weiner and Konstanz colleagues 
Wolfgang Eggert and Bernd Genser for their comments and suggestions. Versions of the 
paper were also presented at IIPF 2004 congress in Milan and NTA 2004 annual conference 




“although it is not desirable  to tax capital 
income on a source basis [because source-
based taxes are distortionary], it is not 
administratively  feasible  to tax capital on a 








Throughout history two key functions have traditionally been associated with government: 
issuing high-powered money and levying taxes. However most European Union member 
states have relinquished the former function to the European Central Bank.  
 
Exercising the latter remains their last right of sovereignty. Therefore it makes sense to keep 
the power to levy tax at the national level, as long as this does not interfere with the exercise 
of similar powers by other member states. This implies organising the taxation of 
internationally mobile flows of goods, assets and income in a way consistent with that 
principle, which is the principle of subsidiarity.
2  
 
Beyond the right of sovereignty associated with the privilege of levying taxes, is the right of a 
jurisdiction to conduct its own fiscal policy in line with its own preferences for the quantity 
and type of public goods and services, as well as the distribution of the tax burden between 
individuals and types of goods and income. Put another way, this is the right of an 
administration to make its own decisions about the functions of taxation, and thus the roles of 
government pointed out by Musgrave and Musgrave (1980), under the condition of non- or 
least interference with similar decisions by other member states. 
 
Those decisions are, in many countries, still influenced by the global income approach 
introduced by Haig (1921) and Simons (1930). As a consequence, for those countries, an 
Ideal Tax System, or ITS, should allow each government to tax every domestic taxpayer on his 
or her worldwide global income, at an individualised rate depending on, e.g., the size of his or 
her income. We term this approach HS-ITS, where HS refers to Haig-Simons. However, for 
various reasons, some governments, e.g. Belgium, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, 
have deleted the final part of this definition, adopting a system where capital income is taxed 
at a flat rate. Let us term that system DIT-ITS where DIT means Dual Income Tax. The main 
argument justifying that dissenting view as still supporting an ITS is that nowadays the area of 
mobility of capital is larger than that of labour, and of the territory of the jurisdiction of 
national tax authorities.  
 
 
1 Slemrod (1995) quoted by Cnossen (2002). 
2 For a discussion of the principle of subsidiarity see a.o. Sinn et al. (1993) and Sinn (1994), and for its 
application to taxation, Cnossen (2002) and McLure (2001).   3
Facilitating the implementation of an ITS, either HS-ITS or DIT-ITS, is the target of many 
international organisations such as the OECD and the EU authorities. The choice between HS 
and DIT depends on the sovereignty of national authorities. 
 
In this paper, we establish that maximising the fiscal power at the discretion of domestic or 
local authorities is a basic position. Attempts to go beyond this principle and to further 
centralise tax policy, have been are unsuccessful.  
 
We also introduce a second characteristic of an ITS: each government is allowed to use the 
proceeds of the tax either to finance public goods and services or for distributive or incentive 
purposes. Adding that characteristic rules out using the proceeds of the tax to grant refunds to 
resident taxpayers for taxes levied abroad, including through a crediting mechanism. Adding 
this second characteristic is not a plea to abolish the withholding tax but possibly to eliminate 
crediting.  
 
Regarding the taxation of savings income of individual taxpayers, the arguments above lead 
us to present an idea to tax that income that is based on present EU Commission proposals, on 
a recent Dutch reform, and on the current US tax system for taxing foreign savings income. 
The system is designed with reference to the Euro zone of the European Union, but could be 
adapted for, and applied to, other areas.  It has the following characteristics: (1) participating 
jurisdictions levy a withholding tax, whose rate is determined by the EU member state of 
residence of the investor, on EU source income paid to EU fiscal residents, (2) the 
withholding tax is computed on a presumptive income translated to EU currency by the 
country of residence of the investor, (3) the withholding tax is applied by each participating 
bank to its liabilities toward its customers who are residents of that EU country, separated into 
country baskets, and its proceeds are then transferred to that country. 
 
In Section 2 we review the present situation from an institutional viewpoint and introduce our 
proposal. In Section 3, we propose a more formal analysis of our proposition. This follows 
closely the model used by Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Ligthart (2003), 
showing the properties and the sustainability of our view, including in the framework of a 





The taxation of international savings income, including that among European Union member 
states, is based on OECD model conventions, although the EU Commisssion has issued some 
proposals to attempt to create a European system.  
 
2.1. The OECD model 
 
The OECD model aims to eliminate, or at least limit, double taxation of cross-border flows of 
income. For savings income, the power of taxation is shared between home and host 
jurisdictions, allowing the source country – that of the bank which pays – to levy a 
withholding tax, and enabling the investor’s residence jurisdiction to levy another tax, 
provided either that the withholding tax can be imputed on domestic tax liabilities – up to the 
highest of those liabilities on that income –  or that the residence country exempts foreign   4
income up to a small fraction. With respect to the ITS  defined above, the imputation 
mechanism provided by the OECD is almost ideal. It would be ideal if supplemented by a 
system of exchange of information between payers or their governments and tax authorities of 
the country of residence of investors, on the one hand (thus meeting the first characteristic of 
an ITS) and by the abolition of withholding tax levied at source, on the other hand (to satisfy 
the second characteristic). Therefore the OECD model can be viewed as an Almost Ideal Tax 
System or AITS (see Gérard and Hadhri,1994). 
 
2.2. EU advances 
 
Three successive proposals at EU level have tried to improve the OECD model system. 
  
In 1989, EU Commissioner Christiane Scrivener proposed to adopt at the EU level, for 
interest on bonds only, a common withholding tax of, say, 15 per cent. Since exchange of 
information was not considered in the Scrivener proposal, the system was not an ITS; it 
privileged taxation at source. The proposal was not adopted.  
 
Nine years later, the Commission returned with the Verona coexistence model
3 that allowed 
governments to choose between levying a withholding tax or engaging in exchange of 
information. That new proposal was also rejected. 
 
Finally, in 2001, the EU governments rallied to the Feira compromise
4, named after the 
Portuguese city where the Council of Finance Ministers met. The ideal of ITS was again 
affirmed, and a system of exchange of information would be launched starting in 2005, for all 
but three member states.  Those three, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg – which have bank 
secrecy rules including with respect to their own residents (at least while they are alive) – 
only agreed to levy a withholding tax progressively increased up to 35 per cent, and to 
transfer 75 per cent of the collected revenue to the residence countries of the foreign EU 
investors. They also agreed to move to information exchange not later than in 2010, provided 
that a similar system was in place with EU neighbouring jurisdictions, including Switzerland 
and the Channel Islands.  
 
2.3. The EU and Switzerland 
 
The outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the Swiss authorities is not the adhesion 
of the Swiss to exchange of information with the EU, even though the Swiss institutions have 
accepted, in some respects, to provide the US authorities with such information. However the 
Swiss authorities agree to levy a withholding tax on income paid to EU residents, and thus to 
enter a mechanism similar to that conceded to Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg within the 
EU, in which 75 per cent of the revenue collected at source is paid to the country of residence 
of the investor. 
 
                                                 
3 European Commission (1998). 
4 European Commission (2001).   5
2.4. Three concerns around Ramsey and the Belgian, Dutch and Nordic 
innovations 
 
The European ITS targeted process reviewed above deserves at least three comments. 
 
First, the process is limited to interest on bonds and on some related assets. It does not cover 
dividends or capital gains. And, above all, it does not extend to a large class of other assets 
with the same safety as bonds: insurance products. Thus the Feira process, through exchange 
of information, leads to taxation, and possibly heavy taxation, of a single type of income, 
although a close substitute exists which escapes exchange of information and thus taxation. 
According to Ramsey’s (1927) perspective, this is taxing a bad candidate.
5 
 
Second, the European process is not Ramsey–consistent because it applies to a territory which 
is too small. Saving is much more mobile than labour: the area of mobility of capital is the 
entire world, while that of labour is the country – but for skilled individuals.
6 Therefore 
organising exchange of information within the EU is recognising the territory of the Union as 
a single jurisdiction. However the EU is geographically smaller than the actual area of savings 
mobility.  
 
The third comment is that a series of countries have already tackled our first two concerns.  
 
Twenty years ago, Belgium gave up de jure a global system which it had failed to apply de 
facto, and recognised a withholding tax levied at source as a final tax. This is in line with the 
second concern above. Belgium is actually an interesting case: its openness, due to its size 
and geographic position, and its long experience of monetary union with Luxembourg, makes 
it a potential forerunner of the future fate of others.  
 
Recently, the Netherlands joined Belgium in levying a flat tax on savings income. But, the 
Netherlands met our first concern (above), by giving up any ambition to pursue bankers’ 
imagination but tackling the issue of substitutability among types of assets. To this end they 
decided on a flat tax levied on the presumptive income from the financial wealth.
7 The dual 
tax system adopted by the Nordic countries also imposes a flat rate on capital income.
8 
 
2.5. US Qualified Intermediaries 
 
Finally, the US authorities have proposed to banks worldwide, thus bypassing the foreign 
governments, that they become qualified intermediaries (QI) of the IRS, the Internal Revenue 
Service. Most banks have accepted and have committed themselves: (1) to levy the 
withholding tax provided for by the treaty between the US and any given country on US 
source income paid to a fiscal resident of that given country, and to transfer the collected 
amount to the US authorities; (2) to be audited by IRS agreed experts, and (3) to register the 
                                                 
5 In the good old days when labour and savings were both inelastically supplied in the country of residence of 
their holders, and when the imagination of the bankers was more limited, BTS could be considered as consistent 
with Ramsey’s view that income tax should be negatively proportional to the supply elasticity of the respective 
factors. 
6 People leaving the South or the East of the EU at the start of their career and possibly going back at home at the 
end, irrespective of their skill, cannot be considered as mobile workers in economic terms.  
7 See e.g. Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001). 
8 See e.g. Sorensen (1994).   6
tax identification number of US fiscal residents who are paid income by the bank. Failure to 
accept such commitment compels the bank either to provide the US authorities with full 
identification of non-US customers or to pay a 30 per cent withholding tax on any payment 
received from a US source, including values of financial assets.  
 
2.6. The proposal: taxation at source at a rate determined by the country of 
residence 
 
All these premises support the following proposal, which marries taxation at source with 
determination of the tax rate by the country of residence: 
 
(1) EU jurisdictions, or at least a subset of EU jurisdictions decided to join that system, 
levy on EU source income paid to EU fiscal residents, a withholding tax whose rate is 
determined by the EU member state of residence of the investor; 
(2) that withholding tax is computed on a presumptive income translated into an EU 
currency determined by the country of residence concerned; 
(3) that withholding tax is applied by each participating bank on its liabilities toward its 
customers resident in that EU country, divided into country baskets; its proceeds are 
then transferred to that country. 
 
Point (1) is inspired by the US QI system for non-US fiscal residents, which seems to be 
acceptable to non-EU countries and institutions, as exemplified by the agreement between the 
EU Commission and the Swiss authorities; point (2) comes from Dutch recent reform and 
meets the first concern above; finally point (3) combines the US country basket practice and 




The system just described seems to be feasible. Moreover it is an ITS, or more precisely a DT-
ITS. Section 3 below demonstrates this, and shows that such a system can rule out fiscal 
externalities, that it supports a Pareto optimum with taxation, and that it is sustainable in the 
long run in the framework of a repeated game. Such a framework is especially relevant, since 
the real world in general and Europe especially, is a repeated game. To conduct this exercise 
we use a formal setting similar to that employed by Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen 





In this section we consider two jurisdictions of different size, denoted respectively by 
subscripts a for the smaller and A for the larger. By assumption, the level of saving in the 
larger jurisdiction (or the number of residents) is θ  time larger than in the smaller. We use 
this framework to prove that the proposal for an international tax system suggested above is 
an ideal tax system, or ITS.  
 
We start by considering a single type of asset, so that our argument focuses on the qualified 
intermediaries (QI) inspired part of the proposal, rather than on the one based on the Dutch   7
reform. Then, in the last part of the section, we propose a reinterpretation of the model, which 
extends the argument to the Dutch side of the proposal. Since there is only a single agent in 
each jurisdiction, there is no room to discriminate between resident taxpayers or to deal with 
progressive vs flat taxation. 
 
3.1. The model 
 
In the smaller jurisdiction the savings income of the typical individual agent is  
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where   is the tax rate on income from investment at home by residents of country a, m  is 





a x  is the fraction of 
the investment of a resident of country a invested domestically, and 1 a x −  is its counterpart 
invested abroad. Moreover  A p  stands for the fraction of the information transmitted to a from 
A, and the last term,  a β , refers to the cost of investing abroad; we assume that  ] [ 0, a β ∈∞ .  
 
Maximising (1) with respect to  a x  shows that the amount of saving invested abroad is such 
that the investor is indifferent between investing an extra unit at home or abroad. Then 
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The amount of tax revenue available to the government of the smaller jurisdiction is  
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In such a system, tax revenues of government a consists of  
-  , the proceeds of the tax on the domestic investment of resident taxpayers; 
h
aa mx
-  () () ( max ,0 1 1
hf
Aa A a pm m x ) a µ −− − , the proceeds of the tax levied at home on the 
foreign income of resident taxpayers, net of the fraction  a µ  repaid to the foreign 
jurisdiction to compensate for the service of information exchange; 
-  () 1
f
Aa mx A λ − , the proceeds of the withholding tax levied abroad on capital income 
paid to taxpayer residents of the home jurisdiction which is transferred to the home or 
residence jurisdiction; thus  .75 λ =  in the EU 75 per cent mechanism,  1 λ =  in the 
US QI system;   8
-  () ( 11
f
aA mx ) a θ λ −− , the proceeds of the withholding tax on capital income paid to 
non-residents, net of the fraction of that income transferred to the jurisdiction of 
residence of those non-residents; 
-  () () max ,0 1
hf
aA a A pm m x A θµ −− , the proceeds of the tax levied abroad on income of 
the residents of the foreign jurisdiction, through the information transmitted by the 
home jurisdiction, which is repaid to that jurisdiction. 
 
Keen and Ligthart (2003) provide an investigation of the role of the parameterµ . In the rest 
of this  paper we will ignore it, formally setting  0, , i ia A µ = = .  
 
In this model, information exchange can be associated with the usual crediting mechanism. In 
this case, foreign tax is credited up to the maximum of the domestic tax rate; this is reflected 





 which implies that, in case of full information exchange, 
the foreign income of a resident taxpayer of jurisdiction a is taxed at rate   if m  , and 











Finally, the objective of any jurisdiction i (i = a, A) is to maximise its social welfare function 
 
 ,, ii i i Sy u T i a = +=  (4) 
 
where   illustrates how much the jurisdiction values public goods; like Keen and Ligthart 




3.2. Benchmark: an Ideal Tax System (ITS)  
 
In an ITS – or more precisely in its translation into this model – each government 
 
(1) is able to tax the worldwide income of its resident taxpayers at a rate it determines 
itself, and  
(2) is permitted to use the whole revenue generated by that tax.  
 
This implies, for jurisdiction a, (1) effectively taxing both the domestic and foreign the 
income paid out to its residents at rate  , and (2) being able to use the amount collected for 
its own purposes. Point (2) rules out having to give up part of the collected amount, say, 
through a tax credit designated to offset foreign taxation. This is irrelevant to the present 
model where the existence of a non-zero cost of investing abroad implies that if foreign and 




3.3. Full Information Exchange (FIE) 
 
A full information exchange, or FIE, is one – but not the only – way to implement an ITS. In 
FIE 1, , i p ia A ==, and no fee is refunded to the other country to compensate for the   9
exchange of information,  0 i µ = . In that world, and given our assumption that  ] [ 0, a β ∈∞ , 
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 (5) 
 
for the smaller and the larger jurisdiction respectively. That result is internationally Pareto 
optimal and characterises the social welfare attainable under an ITS. Notice that per capita 
social welfare in the larger country is   divided by 
*
A S θ . 
 
3.4. OECD’s Almost Ideal Tax System (AITS) 
 
Under an almost ideal tax system (AITS), each government sets its withholding tax rates 
separately. Despite the fact that taxpayers have to report their foreign income to their home 
tax authorities, they have no incentive to do this, except to avoid the shame of tax evasion. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that they do not report their foreign income, and 
consequently, to consider the OECD system as a pure source tax system. Then, maximising 
(4) with respect to the withholding tax rate applied to income paid to non residents, implies 
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By offering foreign investors a tax rate lower than they are deemed to pay at home, each 
government tries to attract foreign capital to get taxable income. These results however are 





















since the values of public goods are deemed not to be less than unity. Notice that the 
withholding tax rates can vary from one jurisdiction to another, just as domestic rates.  
 
Interestingly, the smaller jurisdiction can be made better off by the OECD’s AITS.  Saving 
abroad will enable part of domestic savings to escape full taxation, while attracting savings 
from abroad will push up tax revenue. Should the smaller country be small enough, it can then 
be better off. To illustrate, consider the case where the jurisdictions are identical except for 
size – all the parameters are identical across jurisdictions while  1 θ > . In this case the smaller 






θ >− . (8) 
   10
However, taken together the two countries are worse off, so that no side payment is possible 
from the larger country to the smaller one. Nevertheless the threshold defined by equation (8) 
will still play a role later on in this paper. 
 































  =− −−    
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 (9) 
 
Notice that both Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Lighthart (2003) assume that 
domestic tax rates are exogenously given, being a sort of global income tax rate uniformly 
applied to residents’ domestic income. Should these rates be endogenous, we have, 


































and these rates increase with the value of public goods and the costs of investing abroad. It 
turns out that, if these costs vanish, all tax rates also vanish, while if the costs vanish for 




A m  are set to zero while the other two rates 
are still positive so that the small jurisdiction taxes income paid to foreigners more than it 
taxes income paid to residents. 
 
3.5. The EU journey 
 
In this section we successively review the Scrivener mechanism of a common withholding 
tax, suggested by the EU Commission in 1989, the Verona co-existence model proposed in 
1998 and finally the mechanism provided by the Feira agreement of 2001. 
 
3.5.1. The Scrivener mechanism 
 
The OECD system seems to be a bad mix of non-enforced exchange of information and 
incentives to tax evasion. In contrast the Scrivener proposal of a common withholding rate 
across European countries frees taxpayers from the shame of not reporting foreign income, at 
least if the common withholding tax is a final levy for investors. 
 
Analytically there are three ways to cope with the Scrivener proposal, depending on how the 
rate of withholding tax is determined. 
   11
First, we can suppose that each jurisdiction selects the rate in a non-cooperative manner. This 
produces the same game as the OECD system, and is the case considered by most authors. 
Second we imagine that all jurisdictions choose the rate together. In this case it is quite 
realistic to suppose that, given that unanimity must prevail when tax decisions are taken, the 
common withholding tax rate 
f m is such that 
 







and one of the two jurisdictions will experience a welfare loss, becoming worse off compared 
to the OECD system.  
 
Finally, it may be that the jurisdictions will choose the value which maximises their joint 
welfare, in which case they will maximise  a SS +  with respect to a common  . The first 
order condition of this maximisation implies that, at equilibrium, the value of m
f m
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+   (12) 
 
which is equivalent to ITS only if both jurisdictions are identical except for size. Thus, in 
general, even under the optimistic view that a common value for the withholding tax can be 
agreed, the Scrivener proposal is not ITS.  
 
3.5.2. The Verona co-existence model 
 
In the Verona co-existence model, jurisdictions are allowed to either levy a withholding tax or 
to exchange information. It can easily be shown that in the former case they will adopt the 
same policy as under the Scrivener mechanism, while in the latter case they will decide to 
provide no information.
9 As shown by Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Ligthart 








mp 0 = =  (13) 
based, a.o., on 
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These results are characterised by no spontaneous exchange of information and attractive 
withholding tax rates for foreigners, they illustrate a non-cooperative situation.  
 
Cooperative behaviour, with   and m 1 i p = 0
f
i =  if  0 i β = , could make both jurisdictions 
better off but immediately raises the issue of its sustainability, a question that we will not 
investigate here – see Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Ligthart (2003) on that 
point. 
                                                 
9 Notice that the latter result differs from that obtained by Bachetta and Espinoza (1995; 2000).   12
 
3.5.3. The Feira agreement 
 
The Feira agreement per se needs no further analysis. Indeed it sets forth the second 
component – exchange of information – of the Verona model, although it applies the first one 
to three countries with  .75 λ = . Details of most of these results can be found in Huizinga and 
Nielsen (2003). In a static setting they can be summarised as, 
 
 
() a) withholding tax :  , 1 0
2
b) information exchange :  0, 0


























The inequalities on lines a) and b) indicate that the solution for the withholding rate and the 
level of information exchange, respectively, are not optimal from a cooperative point of view; 
they are both too small since the welfare level of the other country would be improved by an 
increase in those values.  
 
Let us simply observe the following two points.  
 
If the two jurisdictions are both allowed to apply a withholding tax at source without 
exchange of information, and if the values of the withholding tax rates are not determined in 
such a way as to maximise the joint social welfare, then the smaller jurisdiction has no 
interest in adhering to a system of transfer of collected revenue while the larger is interested 
in subscribing to such a system. Indeed, we have that 
 
 























and, if the jurisdictions are equal in everything but size, the first expression is negative while 
the second is positive.  
 
Otherwise, if the rate is unique and determined cooperatively so that it maximises the joint 
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   13
which again deviates from the ITS outcome unless the jurisdictions are identical except 
possibly for size. 
 
3.6. The proposition 
 
Let us now turn to the proposal described in Section 2.6. We first show that the proposed 
system is an Ideal Tax System, ITS, and thus is equivalent to full exchange of information, 
FIE. Then, we show how that system supports a Pareto improvement and how it is sustainable 
in a repeated game setting. 
 
3.6.1. A one shot game  
 
Suppose that the game consists for each jurisdiction, e.g. for jurisdiction a, in selecting the 
withholding tax levied by the other jurisdiction, A, on income paid out to residents of the 
former jurisdiction, a, both jurisdictions being committed to applying that rate and to fully 
transferring to the jurisdiction of residence of the investor the revenue collected through the 







a Max S y u T = + . (18) 
  
The first order condition implies that  
 





























When 1 A λ = , this equation becomes 
 






which is exactly its value under an Ideal Tax System: the fiscal externality has been 
eliminated by the full transfer process.  
 
To show this, consider the derivative of the A jurisdiction social welfare function with respect 


















A  (22) 
 
which is negative for 
f h
A mm = a  unless 1 A λ = .  
   14
The explanation of the negative sign is that an increasing value of the withholding tax reduces 
the attractiveness of the A jurisdiction and thus tax revenue for that jurisdiction; however that 
argument disappears if the whole tax revenue collected by that means is transferred to the 








= . (23) 
 
This tax system supports a Pareto optimum, although the cooperation is limited to the double 
commitment: 
 
(1)  to allow each foreign jurisdiction to set the withholding tax that the source jurisdiction 
will levy on income paid out in its territory; and 
(2)  to transfer the whole revenue collected through that withholding tax to each relevant 
foreign jurisdiction. 
 
It turns out that, 
 
Proposition 1: An international tax system where each foreign jurisdiction is 
allowed to choose the withholding tax that the source jurisdiction will levy on 
income paid out in its territory, and where the whole revenue collected through 
that withholding tax is transferred to each relevant foreign jurisdiction, is an ideal 
tax system, and thus is equivalent to a system of full information exchange. 
 
The levels of social welfare reached in the jurisdictions are   and   respectively; their 






To illustrate this, consider the case of US QI legislation: a bank in country A levies on income 
paid to residents of country a a withholding tax whose rate is determined by a treaty between 
country a and the US, and whose revenue is fully transferred to the US; merge the US and 
country a and you are exactly in the situation of the proposition discussed here. Income 
obtained in A is taxed at the rate decided by a and the US and the welfare level in A is not 
affected by the size of that tax.  
  
Notice that, if  1 i λ <  (e.g.  .75 i λ = ) as in the post-Feira European Union, the tax system is not 
ITS. Using (20), the a jurisdiction wants A to tax at rate  
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although that rate is too high from the point of view of A’s social welfare. Indeed, using (22) 
and our examination of OECD AITS, we observe that for 
f








< . (25) 
 
The best value for that tax rate from the point of view of A’s social welfare is, see equation (6) 








m =  (26) 
 
 
3.6.2. Pareto improvement 
 
Compared to the OECD AITS, the system discussed here always generates a welfare gain for 
the two jurisdictions taken together and for the larger one on its own. The smaller jurisdiction 
experiences a welfare gain only if it is not too small relative to the larger. Otherwise a side 
payment is necessary to convince the small jurisdiction to join the system. 
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For   that implies  1 u = 1.5 θ < , and so the smaller jurisdiction must be at least two-thirds the 
size of the larger one. Otherwise a side payment is needed. This is always possible since the 
overall gain is positive, summing to, using equations (27) and (29) and assuming the two 








− > . (31) 
 
Thus we can state: 
 
Proposition 2: In an economic setting where jurisdictions are identical except for 
size, an international tax system where each foreign jurisdiction is allowed to 
determine the withholding tax that the source jurisdiction will levy on income 
paid out in its territory, and where the whole revenue collected through that 
withholding tax is transferred to the relevant foreign jurisdiction, improves the 
social welfare of large jurisdictions compared to that obtained under the OECD 
AITS. It improves that of small jurisdictions if they are not too small. Otherwise a   16
side payment from the large jurisdictions is needed to persuade the small 
jurisdictions to join the system. Since overall social welfare goes up, such a 
payment is always possible. 
 
The model used in this discussion, however, does not allow us to investigate the impact of 
giving up individualised taxation of capital income, nor to introduce a presumptive rate of 
return. Nevertheless, the model enables us to discuss the sustainability of the proposition in a 
repeated game framework. 
 
3.6.3. A repeated game 
 
If the game is played repeatedly, which is the case on the real tax scene, can a jurisdiction 
gain by deviating from the ITS equilibrium outcome? And, consequently, what are the non-
cheating conditions?  
 
If jurisdiction a (viz. A) deviates, by which is meant that it sets  0 i λ =  and 
f
i m equal to its 
value given by equation (6), it will experience an immediate gain, reaching a social welfare 
level given by one of the following equations 
 
  ( ) ( )
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++ =+ =+ . (32) 
 
The other jurisdiction will suffer a welfare loss: it will get the AITS  outcome minus the 
proceeds of the withholding tax (since it respects its commitment to transfer this), thus 
 












−− − −− − =− =− . (33) 
 
However jurisdiction A (viz. a) will probably then also decide to give up the system and go 
back forever to OECD AITS. Thus the social welfare level of both jurisdictions will be  i S
− 
which has the value given by equation (9).  
 











+ +>+ (34) 
 
where ρ  stands for the discounting rate and   for the ITS outcome; that outcome is given by 
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0 <  (35) 
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This  non-cheating condition always holds for economically acceptable values of the 
parameters. E.g. suppose  , then equation (35) implies  1 A u = 1.5 1 ρ θ < − , a condition 
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 
1
0 <  (36) 
 









<−  + 
 (37) 
 
which can be compared with equations (8) and (30).  
 
As an example, if  1 a u =  and  .10 ρ = , the larger jurisdiction can not exceed 1.36 times the 
smaller, or the smaller needs to be at least 73 per cent the size of the larger. Otherwise a side 
payment is necessary. This is no problem per se since: even if the larger jurisdiction has to 
compensate its small partner to prevent it from cheating, the non-cheating condition still holds 
for that country. That condition becomes, assuming that the larger jurisdiction differs from the 
smaller only by the size factor θ ,  
 







   +− − + <   
  
1 0 . (38) 
 
For, say u , this holds if  1 = 0.5 ρ < , which is economically meaningful. The threshold value 
of the discounting rate is smaller than in the case where no side payment is made to the 
smaller jurisdiction. 
 
As a conclusion, 
 
Proposition 3: In an economic setting where jurisdictions are identical but in size, 
an international tax system where each foreign jurisdiction is allowed to decide on 
the withholding tax that the source jurisdiction will levy on income paid out in its 
territory, and where the whole revenue collected through that withholding tax is 
transferred to each of those foreign jurisdictions, is sustainable in the long run in 
the framework of a repeated game. If the small jurisdictions are too small for the 
non-cheating condition to hold, a side payment from the large jurisdictions is 
needed to have the small jurisdictions participate honestly to the system; such a 
payment is always possible. 
 
 
3.7. The Dutch face of the proposal 
 
So far we have focused on the IQ face of the proposal, not on the Dutch one. Now assume 
that there are not only two jurisdictions but also two financial products, and that either full   18
exchange of information or the mechanism discussed in Section 3.6 above applies to one 
product (say interest) while OECD AITS applies to the other product (say dividends). Suppose 
also that there is no cost of reorganising a portfolio and no difference in terms of risk among 
the products.  
 





a y a m = −  (39) 
 
from his or her investment in bonds and an income  
 
 

















from his or her investment in shares. Comparing those two equations will convince the 
resident of jurisdiction a to invest in shares. And if a third product that is untaxed in 
jurisdiction A exists, it immediately becomes the most preferred investment. In any case the 




In this framework, Full Information Exchange supports an Ideal Tax System only if it applies 
to all financial products. The same is true for the proposal discussed in Section 3.6. However 
this requires the tax legislator to keep an eye on the imagination of the bankers and the 
insurance companies. A way to escape such a battle of wits is to disregard the various types of 
capital income and to tax a presumptive return on capital instead. This is equivalent to taxing 
the capital itself, and is what we do in the proposal discussed in this paper. The Netherlands 
has also chosen this way to tax income from capital invested at home by its resident 
taxpayers. In the proposal we extend that policy to capital invested abroad: each bank makes a 
basket of presumptive income per jurisdiction of residence of its customers (as it does for the 
US  QI legislation) and applies to of each basket income the withholding tax set by the 
corresponding residence jurisdiction (again as it does for QI).   
 
Then, equation (39) applies to any financial product and 
*





This paper first reviewed various systems for taxing international savings income, including 
the system suggested by the OECD tax treaties model, the series of mechanisms proposed by 
European Union authorities and the ways adopted by different countries, including Belgium, 
the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the United States. For the US the review focussed 
on the qualified intermediaries mechanism through which banks around the world levy tax 
rates set by tax treaties between the US and the respective jurisdictions of residence of the 
customers of those banks, and transfer to the US the revenue generated by the tax.  
 
Based on this review, we have proposed a system which has the following characteristics, 
   19
(1) EU jurisdictions, or at least a subset of EU jurisdictions decided to join that system, 
levy on EU source income paid to EU fiscal residents, a withholding tax whose rate is 
determined by the EU member state of residence of the investor; 
(2) the withholding tax is computed on a presumptive income determined by the country 
of residence concerned and translated to EU currency; 
(3) the withholding tax is applied by each participating bank on its liabilities to its 
customers who are residents of each EU country, separated into country baskets; its 
proceeds are then transferred to each relevant country. 
 
Point (1) is inspired by US QI regarding non-US fiscal residents and seems to be acceptable to 
non-EU countries and institutions (on the grounds of the agreement between the EU 
Commission and the Swiss authorities); point (2) comes from recent Dutch reform and meets 
a concern about the existence of various substitutable forms of savings; finally point (3) 
combines the country baskets provided by the US QI legislation and the cross-border tax 
revenue transfers from the source to the residence jurisdictions provided for by both the EU 
and the US rules.  
 
We then examined this system and its premises, adapting the modelling approach used by 
Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Lighthart (2003). Although this form of modelling 
does not allow us to investigate the impact of giving up individualised taxation of capital 
income (i.e. of moving from HS-ITS to DIT-ITS), or of introducing a presumptive rate of 
return as in the Netherlands, it does enable us to prove that the system (1) is equivalent to 
cooperative full exchange of information (Proposition 1), (2) represents a Pareto improvement 
for large jurisdictions and also for small ones, provided that they are not too small (in which 
case a feasible side payment can be requested from the large jurisdictions) (Proposition 2), 
and (3) is sustainable in the long run in the framework of a repeated game, provided that the 
large jurisdictions are ready to compensate the too small ones for adopting a non cheating 
attitude through a feasible side payment, if necessary (Proposition 3). This last proposition is 
especially important since the tax scene is a repeated game. 
 
Future research should address the impact of giving up individualised taxation of capital 
income, thus moving from HS-ITS to DIT-ITS, and the use of a presumptive rate of return on 
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